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TAXING INCOME FROM THE EXCHANGE
OF PROPERTY

JUST

By George T. Evans of the Denver Bar

at this time the attention of many people is focused
upon the Constitution because of the recent decision by
Judge William Clark of the Federal District Court of
New Jersey that the Eighteenth Amendment not having been
ratified in, a convention called for that purpose is therefore
invalid. If nothing more may be said for the decision, it
doubtless does have merit in these days of "trick" legislative
enactments in that it has brought the people of the United
States face to face with the fact that there is still a fundamental
law of the land. Nobody will deny that the Eighteenth
Amendment furnishes an interesting topic for discussion, if
for no other reason than because it affects us in our drinking
or non-drinking. But there is another Amendment which
touches us almost as intimately, which has now passed more
or less beyond the realm of popular discussion-an Amendment which hits us in our pocketbooks rather than in our
stomachs. I mean the Sixteenth or Income Tax Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
The Sixteenth Amendment, which is certainly not encumbered with surplus verbiage, was adopted almost eighteen
years ago, eight Income Tax Acts have been passed by Congress under its authority, many phases of it have been tested
in the courts, but can we yet say that either the courts, the
people or Congress know definitely everything that it means?
Of one thing it seems we may be sure and that is that the question, of what is income can never be settled conclusively by
legislative fiat. Has Congress ever attempted to do just that?
Before we answer that question let us look at' Sections
111, 112 and 113 of the Revenue Act of 1928-the present
law. These sections provide for the determination and recognition of gain or loss from the sale, exchange or other disposition of property. By specific exception the exchange of
real estate held for productive use in trade or business or for
investment and not primarily for sale solely for other real
estate to be so held is not a gain or loss transaction. Exchanges
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of personal property under the same circumstances are also
taken out of the category of transactions from which gain or
loss may arise. But, by an exception to the exception, the
exchange of stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates
of trust or beneficial interest and other securities or evidences
of indebtedness are, according to the Revenue Act of 1928,
gain or loss transactions. In other words, the exchange of a
share of common stock which cost less than the fair market
value on the date of the exchange of another share of common
stock in a different corporation for which it was exchanged
results in gain that is recognized as taxable under Sections
111, 112 and 113 of the Revenue Act of 1928. In enacting
these sections has Congress in effect defined "income"? If
so, is the definition within the meaning of the term "incomes"
in the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution? Or has
Congress gone outside the meaning of the word "incomes" in
the Sixteenth Amendment and thus exceeded its power thereunder?
Before we can find an answer to these inquiries it will
be necessary to turn back the whirligig of time to the year
1895, for in that year the Supreme Court by its decision in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 158 U. S.601,
not only demolished the then existing system of income taxation in the United States but forever banished the possibility
of erecting another until the Constitution was changed. Speaking of the Act of August 15, 1894, the court said:
"First: We adhere to the opinion already announced that, taxes on
real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the rents or income of real
estate are equally direct taxes.
"Second. We are of the opinion that taxes on personal property, or
on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes.
"Third. The tax imposed by . . . .the Act of 1894, so far as it falls
on the income of real estate and of personal property, being a direct-tax within
the meaning of the Constitution, is . . . . unconstitutional and void because
not apportioned . ..."

Obviously this decision did not attempt to define "income" but it is an important decision in our present inquiry
because of the background it furnishes for the Sixteenth
Amendment. Its effect was to make the source from which
income arose the criterion of whether or not a tax on that
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income was or was not a direct tax. In other words, after
the Pollock decision, income from property could not be taxed
unless that tax were apportioned, as required by Article 1,
Section 2, Clause 3, and Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4 of the
original Constitution.
The impracticability of apportioning an income tax was
realized, and during the years between 1895 and 1913 the
Sixteenth Amendment was advocated, proposed and finally
submitted to the States in the following words:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes
from whatever source derived without regard to apportionment among the
several states and without regard to any census or enumeration."

On February 25, 1913, the Amendment was proclaimed
adopted.
It will be noted that "income" is not defined in the
Amendment. The only purpose of the Amendment was to
eliminate the source of income from consideration in determining the constitutionality of a tax laid thereon. As was
said on this point by Mr. Chief Justice White in Brushaber
v. The Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1:
"....

there is no escape from the conclusion that the Amendment was drawn

for the purpose of doing away for the future with the principle upon which
the Pollock case was decided . ..

."

The reason for the Sixteenth Amendment is thus apparent. It was not intended to, nor did it, define "income"
but the term "incomes" is used therein. May Congress by
legislation alter the import of "incomes" to suit the variable
concept of "income" in the minds of the changing majority
of its members, or does "incomes" have a fixed meaning with
which Congress is not permitted to tamper? Let us see what
the Supreme Court has said on the subject.
"..... There would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given

the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given
to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and what that meaning is has now
become definitely settled by decisions of this court." (Merchants' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509)

Again we must glance into history. What meaning has
been given to the word "incomes" by the Supreme Court as
that word was used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of
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1909? We turn to Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231
U. S. 399, a case arising under the Act of 1909 and one of the
really famous cases in income taxation; a case wherein the
defendant was the present Collector of Internal Revenue for
Colorado, and counsel for the plaintiff was then and is still
one of the leaders of the Colorado Bar. There, Mr. Justice
Pitney, speaking for the Supreme Court, said:
". ...
Income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined . .. ."

In connection with this definition of "income" it must be
remembered that the Act under examination laid a tax on
doing business in the corporate form and that one of the points
made by the plaintiff was that the mining of gold did not
constitute doing business within the meaning of the Act. But,
said the court of the activities of the corporation, ".

.

. it is

employing capital and labor in transmuting part of the royalty
into personalty." This, as the court viewed the matter, was a
process akin to manufacturing giving rise to income, as above
defined, from doing business.
Here, then, is the first authoritative definition of "income"
in a taxing Act operating before the Sixteenth Amendment
was adopted. Does it throw any light upon what constitutes
income from the disposition of property through a transaction
which is not a sale under an Income Tax Act effective after
the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment? Thus far it probably does not. The decision in effect was that where the inherent characteristics or inherent nature of property was,
through a process similar to manufacturing, transmuted from
personalty into realty, that process was doing business and
hence income arising from the process was a proper measure
of the tax laid by the Act of 1909.
Let us proceed, however, to examine another case arising
under the same Act where there was a conversion of real
property into cash but where that conversion was not the result
of any process.
The leading case on this phase of the question is Doyle v.
Mitchell Brothers Company, 247 U. S. 183, decided in 1917.
One of the questions in that case was whether or not income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment was derived
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from the actual sale of a capital asset (timberland) for cash.
The court held that the gain from such a transaction was income according to the Sixteenth Amendment and this although there was no process of conversion involved. The
court said:
" ....
Selling for profit is too familiar a business transaction to permit us
to suppose that it was intended to be omitted from consideration in an act
for taxing doing business in corporate form upon the basis of the income received "from all sources"."

So much for the meaning of the word "income" in the
Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909. It probably may safely
be said that so far as any income arising from the disposition
of property was concerned where there was no sale, in the
light of these decisions there must have been a conversion of
that property before taxable income could have been received
but a process of conversion was not essential.
"When we come to apply the Acts to gains acquired through an increase in the value of capital assets .

question of difficulty appear .

...

.

.

and converted into money ....

" (Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.)

Was any change in this view brought about by the Sixteenth Amendment? We shall see.
The first case arising after the Sixteenth Amendment in
which the Supreme Court felt called upon to define "income"
was the famous "stock-dividend case" of Eisner v. Macomber,
272 U. S. 189, in which the present Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court was successful as counsel in
having that part of the Revenue Act of 1916 which laid a tax
upon stock-dividends declared unconstitutional. In this case
Mr. Justice Pitney, who had written the definition for the
court in the Howbert case, and applied it in the Doyle case,
speaking of the definition said:
"After examining dictionaries in common use ....
we find little to add
to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation
Tax Act of August 5, 1909 . ...
'Income may be defined as the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood
to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which
it was applied in the Doyle Case."

Thus, where there has been a sale of a capital asset
(property) the idea that there must have been a conversion of

DICTA

the property seems to permeate these definitions. What is
the meaning of "conversion"? At law, of course, it means
the unlawful exercise of dominion over the chattels of another. Obviously it was not used in that class. In equity it
means that fictitious change in the inherent nature of property
adopted by courts in order that substantial justice may be done.
Conversion was not used strictly in that sense in the definitionabove, because the conversion which took place in the case
above adverted to was not fictitious but actual. But the equitable meaning may, however, have tinged the meaning involved.
To define "conversion" in its ordinary sense we must look
for its ordinary meaning in dictionaries in common use. In
Webster's International Dictionary we find:
"Conversion:
(1)
The act of turning or changing from one state or
condition to another, or the state of being changed; transmutation, change.
The artificial conversion of water into ice-Bacon.
The conversion of aliment into fat-Arbuthnot."

We turn to the definition of "transmute" and find that
it is:
"To change from one nature, form, or substance into another; to transform."

We look up the word "transform" and find that it means:
"(1)
To change the form of; to change in shape or appearance; to
metamorphose; as, a caterpillar is ultimately transformed into a butterfly."

The illustrative example of the use of the word is:
"Love may transform me to an oyster"-Shakesphere.

All of these definitions are from Webster's International
Dictionary.
And in the New Standard Dictionary "conversion" is
defined as follows:
"Conversion: (1) The act of converting or of being converted; change from
one state or position to another, or from one form to another; as the conversion of iron into steel; exchange of one object or thing for another, as the conversion of timberland to arable land, of stocks into money, or food into blood,
Syn: change, regeneration, renewal, transformation, transmutation."

Thus, from all the words that might have been used by
the Supreme Court to indicate for the guidance of all the
people, economists, financiers, accountants, farmers, lawyers,
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businessmen, and for that great mass of individuals in the
United States who come within none of these classifications,
what sort of a disposition of capital assets (property) resulted
in taxable income from a transaction which was not a sale,
the court selected the word "conversion". Surely no one is
entitled to presume that the word was chosen thoughtlessly,
nor used inaptly, nor in any but its ordinary meaning in the
sense of its most common acceptation by that body of people
of all kinds and varying degrees of education to whom it must
be understood to have been addressed. Apparently, conversion in its most common acceptation always denotes a change
in inherent character, and, if it is not desired to indicate such
a change, then conversion is not the word to be used. The
charge of selecting the wrong word to thus express its meaning could hardly be made against the court which used it in
the definition of "income".
Let us now look at the background of Eisner v. Macomber for further light on the word "conversion" as used
in. that decision. We turn to Stratton's Independence v. Howbert. In that case in the words of the court one of the points
at issue was "that the proceeds of mining operations result
from a conversion of the capital represented by real estate
into capital represented by cash . . ." The decision in the
particular case of Stratton's Independence v. Howbert was
that income for the purpose of measuring the excise tax on
corporations laid by the Act of August 5, 1909, upon the privilege of doing business in the corporate form was derived from
the business of converting the capital asset real estate into cash
through the process of mining ". . . equivalent in its results
to a manufacturing process". The conclusion to be drawn
from this use of the word "conversion" and the explanatory
statements in the decision might be that the court had in mind
when it used the word a change in the very nature, in the
essential characteristic, of property, a change brought about
by a process so that as a result of the process what was real
property before would be personal property afterwards-a
transmutation of the inherent nature of property by a process
in this case similar to manufacture and similar to the changes
which take place in the examples illustrating the word "conversion" in Webster's International Dictionary.
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personalty". (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert)

And so, the question of whether the mere conversion of
the capital asset real estate into cash in an isolated transaction
not connected with a tax on corporations making a business
of such conversion through a process, was income, was not
covered by the decision in the Howbert case. An inference
might perhaps be drawn that such a conversion did not give
rise to income.
Then came the decision in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers
Company. One question there was whether or not income for
the purpose of measuring the excise tax laid by the Act of
August 5, 1909, on doing business in corporate form, was
derived from the sale of a capital asset in an isolated transaction not taking place in the regular and ordinary course of
its business. The court held that a gain or profit from such a
conversion was properly considered income for the purpose
of measuring the excise tax, and said in part:
"When we come to apply the act to gains acquired through an increase
in the value of capital assets . . . . and converted into money . . . . questions
of difficulty appear ....
Selling for profit is too familiar a business transaction
to permit us to suppose that it was intended to be omitted from consideration
in an act for taxing doing business in corporate form upon the basis of the
income received 'from all sources'."

Here the word "converted" is used but the case did not
involve any process of conversion. The capital asset, real
property, was by sale actually converted into cash (personal
property) in an isolated transaction. Thus there was a conversion of property of one inherent nature into a property
of a different inherent nature. It is conceivable that the word
"converted" as used in the Doyle decision was used in the same
sense as the word "conversion" in the Howbert decision to
denote this transmutation of inherent nature, this change in
essential characteristics of the property involved, and that the
only difference between the two decisions so far as the words
are concerned is that in the former case there was a process
of conversion and in the latter there was not. The fact that
in both cases what was real property before the conversion
was personal property afterwards is obvious.
After these two decisions involving the Excise Tax Act
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of 1909, which operated before the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, there came in 1920 the decision in Eisner v.
Macomber. This involved the Revenue Act of 1916, which
was, of course, effective after the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment. In that case the court adverted with approval
to its definition of "income" in the Howbert case, the application thereof in the Doyle case, and added to the definition
the following words:
". ...

provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or

conversion of capital assets."

For what reason were these words added? Conceivably
it could have been to harmonize the definition in the Macomber case with the decision in the Howbert case and in the
Doyle case and make the definition consistent with the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. From all of this
would it not seem logical to conclude that the word "conversion" was used in the definition in Eisner v. Macomber
in its ordinary sense, perhaps suggested by its meaning in
equity, but, in any event, to denote an actual conversion such
as takes place when there is an artificial change of water into
ice (Bacon), or where there is a transmutation of aliment
into fat (Arbuthnot), or where a caterpillar is ultimately
transformed into a butterfly (Webster's International Dictionary) ?
And so the rationale of the change in the definition of
"income" as it was in the Howbert case to what it ultimately
became in the Macomber case is perhaps proof that the word
"conversion" was not used by the Supreme Court in any sense
as equivalent of exchange but was used in its ordinary meaning to denote a change and transmutation, not an exchange of
like for like. Certainly if the examples in Webster's International Dictionary cited to illustrate the meaning of the
word "conversion", the changing of water into ice, the changing of aliment into fat, the changing of a caterpillar into a
butterfly, and the transforming of a a man into an oyster, are
examples of what the word "conversion" means, then the mere
trade of a share of common stock (personal property) for one
share of common stock (personal property) would seem to
be a long way from a conversion.
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There cannot be much dispute that such a conversion of
property as is illustrated by the examples from the dictionary
where there is a change in inherent nature does give rise to
taxable income if made at an advantage. In that case property of one kind of a certain nature with certain characteristics
inherent therein, would be parted with, and property of a
different kind, of a different nature, with different inherent
qualities, would be acquired therefor. But any transaction
which does not have these results is perhaps an exchange and
not a change, a trade and not a transmutation, and therefore
not a conversion giving rise to income within the meaning of
the term "incomes" in the Sixteenth Amendment.
Passing over the point that if the tax in effect laid by
Sections 111, 112 and 113 is a direct tax on the unrealized
growth or increase in the value of property it might also be
a direct tax on the property itself, and unconstitutional unless
apportioned, it would, it seems, be extraordinary indeed not
only to permit Congress to disregard the Supreme Court's
definitions of "income" in cases involving Income Tax Laws
operating both before and after the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment, but also to allow that body by legislation to put
into a man's pocket the unrealized increase in the value of
his property at a given date by conjuring out of the uncertainty that he will ever be able to reduce that increase to his
actual possession, the definite present fact that he has already
got it. That conceivably would be to permit the Legislature
to extend a constitutional provision.
We started out to determine whether or not Congress has
attempted to settle by legislature fiat the question of what is
income from the exchange or other disposition of property.
We wanted to discover whether or not in enacting Sections
111, 112 and 113, of the Revenue Act-of 1928, Congress had
in effect defined "income" and, if so, whether or not that definition was within the meaning of the term "incomes" in the
Sixteenth Amendment, or whether it was outside that meaning. We have used up all available data from Which we might
draw conclusions, but we have failed in our undertaking. We
must have more information from the Supreme Court before
we can pursue our inquiry further.

